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This paper provides a quantitative assessment of the eﬀects of inﬂation through changes in the value
of nominal assets. We document nominal positions in the U.S. across sectors as well as diﬀerent
groups of households, and estimate the redistribution brought about by a moderate inﬂation episode.
Redistribution takes the form of “ends-against-the-middle:” the middle class gains at the cost of the
rich and poor. In addition, inﬂation favors the young over the old, and hurts foreigners. A calibrated
OLG model is used to assess the macroeconomic implications of this redistribution under alternative
ﬁscal policy rules. We show that inﬂation-induced redistribution has a persistent negative eﬀect on
output, but improves the weighted welfare of domestic households.
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System.An immediate consequence of an unanticipated change in the price level is redistribution: inﬂa-
tion lowers the real value of nominal assets and liabilities, and thereby redistributes wealth from
lenders to borrowers. Recent literature on the real effects and welfare costs of inﬂation has paid
little attention to redistribution effects. While representative-agent models provide no scope for
redistribution at all, existing studies with heterogeneous agents focus on the effect of inﬂation on
cash balances alone, which make up only a minor fraction of all nominal assets.1
This paper provides a quantitative study of the redistribution effect of inﬂation. We focus on the
question of what would happen if the United States were to enter another inﬂation episode such
as the one experienced during the 1970s. We emphasize the role of money as a unit of account:
inﬂation affects all nominal asset positions, not just cash positions. As a result, we ﬁnd that even
moderate inﬂation leads to substantial wealth redistribution.
Since wealth changes induce agents to adjust their behavior over the entire life cycle, the effects
on individuals are persistent. Moreover, the responses of losers (old lenders) and winners (young
borrowers) do not cancel out, so that aggregates react as well. The magnitude of the aggregate ef-
fects is comparable to those in representative-agent models with monetary frictions, but the effects
arising from redistribution persist long after the end of the inﬂation episode.
We also ﬁnd that the welfare effect on domestic households arising from redistribution is the oppo-
site of what standard monetary models generate: inﬂation-induced redistribution leads to a positive
effect on weighted aggregatewelfare. Financial innovationand foreign borrowing haverecently in-
creased the potential welfare gains from inﬂation, to the point that these gains are now substantially
largerthanconventionalestimatesofthewelfare costofinﬂation. Weconcludethatredistributionis
a key channel for the impact of inﬂation on household behavior, economic aggregates, and welfare.
We arrive at our conclusions by performing the following thought experiment. Suppose an econ-
omy is initially in a low-inﬂation regime, as is the case for the U.S. today. Suppose further that
an episode of moderate inﬂation, such as the 1970s, were to occur. If all real effects of inﬂation
were due to the redistribution (i.e., the only role of money is to serve as a unit of account for as-
sets and liabilities), who would gain and who would lose during this episode, and what economic
effects would arise? We answer these questions in three steps. First, we document nominal as-
set and liability positions in the U.S. economy for various groups of households, as well as the
government and foreign sectors. Second, we estimate the redistribution of wealth generated by a
moderate inﬂation episode under various assumptions on agents’ expectations of—and adjustment
1There is an old tradition in monetary economics that does focus on redistribution—see Fisher (1933) for a classic
contribution.
1to—inﬂation during the episode. Third, we use a calibrated overlapping-generations model to as-
sess aggregate effects and welfare costs under different scenarios for ﬁscal policy, as well as the
behavior of foreigners.
To determine nominal positions, we combine data from the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) and the
1989 and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF). We consider not only directly held nominal
assets and liabilities, but also indirect nominal positions due to shares in investment intermediaries
and the ownership of ﬁrms. For most securities, the data consist of book values that are difﬁcult
to interpret. We thus construct the stream of future nominal payments associated with every major
classofsecurities,andthenrestateallpositionsat marketvalue. Withthisapproachwecanestimate
the duration of agents’ positions, which allows us to gauge the effects of partially anticipated
inﬂation.
We document several stylized facts on net nominal positions that are crucial for understanding
redistribution effects of inﬂation. First, indirect debt positions through equity holdings are an im-
portant part of households’ overall nominal position. Second, foreigners are a major net nominal
lender, especially in the last 15 years. Once indirect debt positions are taken into account, foreign-
ers now hold more U.S. nominal assets than domestic households. Third, in the cross-section of
households, young middle-class cohorts with mortgage debt are the only important net nominal
borrowers. Young rich and poor households, as well as the old at all income levels, are net nominal
lenders.
We perform most of our inﬂation experiments for a benchmark low inﬂation year, 1989. We com-
pute real gains and losses resulting from a change in the unit of account. The size of that change
is motivated by the U.S. experience of the 1970s: we consider a return of the ten-year inﬂation
episode 1973–1982. Our experiments are calibrated to capture different scenarios for how agents
adjust expectations and portfolios during the episode. This leads us to interval estimates for gains
and losses of different sectors and groups of agents. A coalition of rich, poor and old households
loses a total of 6.6–17.6 percent of GDP in present value terms. Roughly one-half of this loss
beneﬁts middle-class households under the age of 45, who receive a gift worth up to 60 percent of
mean cohort net worth. The remainder goes to the government, which gains between 5.2 and 14.1
percent of GDP through a reduction in the real value of its debt.
To assess the aggregate effects of redistribution, we employ a deterministic neoclassical growth
model with overlapping generations. The model is calibrated so that its balanced growth path
matches key aggregate ratios, as well as properties of the wealth and income distribution. To ex-
plore the economy’s response to an inﬂation episode, we treat the transfer of real wealth computed
2in our redistribution exercise as an unanticipated shock. Since the model is designed to isolate the
redistribution effects of inﬂation, we abstract from monetary frictions. Instead, aggregate effects of
inﬂation derive from two sources: direct wealth effects on the different groups of households, and
the response of ﬁscal policy. Fiscal policy must adjust in some dimension, since the reduction of
real government debt presents the government with a windfall gain. We use our model to explore
the response of the economy for a number of different ﬁscal policy rules.
Even though the redistribution shock is zero-sum, aggregate effects arise because net borrowers
(winners) and net lenders (losers) respond differently. The key asymmetry in nominal positions is
that net borrowers tend to be younger than net lenders, which gives rise to two life-cycle effects.
First, a reduction in the labor supply of the young winners (that is, an increase in their consumption
of leisure motivated by an increase in wealth) is not offset by an increase in labor supply by the
old losers, since the latter are retired. Second, an increase in the savings of the young winners is
not fully offset by a decrease in the savings of the old losers, since young households spread any
gain or loss over more remaining periods of life than old households. In our calibrated model, the
ﬁrst effect causes aggregate labor supply to decline by up to 1.5 percent in the decade after the
inﬂation episode. The second effect increases the capital stock by up to 0.8 percent above trend
three decades after the inﬂation episode. The net result is a decline in output over the ﬁrst three
decades after the shock of up to 0.8 percent relative to trend, followed by a smaller temporary
increase.
The effects on the welfare of individual cohorts are large. Retirees lose the most and experience a
decrease in their consumption of up to 12 percent relative to the balanced growth path. In contrast,
consumption of the young middle-class cohorts increases by up to 6 percent. Domestic households
also gain at the expense of foreigners. Using standard weighted welfare measures, we ﬁnd that the
aggregate welfare effect of inﬂation on domestic households is positive. This would be true even
if foreigners were not affected by inﬂation, since the redistribution effect tends to level the overall
wealth distribution. However, the losses incurred by foreigners substantially increase the positive
welfare effect.
Throughout, we emphasize that redistribution effects depend on how quickly agents adjust to inﬂa-
tion. In our experiments, we distinguish surprise inﬂation episodes, during which the duration of
positions is irrelevant, from gradual inﬂation episodes, where gains and losses are relatively larger
on positions of longer duration. In addition to the overall nominal position, the maturity structure
of assets and liabilities is a second important determinant of the redistribution effect of inﬂation.
The main result is that gradual inﬂation episodes hurt foreigners and rich domestic households rel-
atively more than other groups. The foreigners and the rich hold more long-term bonds than poor
3and middle-class households, whose nominal assets are mostly in the form of short-term deposits.
We also show how ﬁnancial innovation and an increasing nominal position of foreigners have re-
cently led to large changes in the potential effects of inﬂation. In the last 15 years, inﬂation risk has
become more evenly distributed across different groups of households. This is partly due to more
widespread equity ownership, which has provided more gains through indirect debt to the poor.
Another reason is that securitization has reduced the maturity mismatch in the ﬁnancial system,
and hence shifted the risk of gradual inﬂation from shareholders to bondholders. Securitization
has also contributed to a decline in the net nominal position of the U.S. business sector, which is
mirrored by a corresponding increase in the net nominal position of foreigners. The net nominal
position of the rest of the world is currently around 30 percent of GDP, while the net nominal
position of U.S. households (who own most of the business sector) approaches zero.
The implications of these changes can be gauged by comparing our results for the benchmark
year 1989 to outcomes based on data from 2001. We ﬁnd that gains and losses under surprise
and gradual inﬂation are more similar in 2001 than they are in 1989; recent changes in ﬁnancial
structure make it harder for agents to adjust quickly to inﬂation. Particularly hard-hit by inﬂation
are foreigners, who by 2001 have become the main net lenders in the economy, and who hold
mostly long-term bonds. As a consequence, while the government’s gain is similar for the two
benchmark years, in 2001 the main loser is the rest of the world, with losses between 5.8 and 13.4
percent of GDP. These losses translate into substantial welfare gains for domestic households, so
that, in terms of redistribution, inﬂation emerges as a highly attractive proposition from a U.S.
perspective.
In the next section, we review the literature. Section 2 presents the distribution of nominal assets
and liabilities in the U.S. economy. Section 3 quantiﬁes the effect of an inﬂation shock. Section 4
presents and calibrates the theoretical model, which is used in Section 5 to analyze the economic
implications of an inﬂation shock. Section 6 concludes.
1 Related Literature
One of the redistribution effects that underlies our results is the surprise revaluation of nominal
government debt. This effect also matters in Bohn’s (1988) study of ﬁscal policy. Bohn considers a
stochastic model with incomplete markets where government debt is nominal. Nominal debt then
provides insurance against the effects of economic ﬂuctuations on the government’s budget. A
negative productivity shock leads to an increase in the price level (through the quantity equation),
4and thereby deﬂates the value of existing government debt. This windfall enables the government
to continue to provide its services without being forced to raise taxes in the downturn. Nominal
debt therefore serves as a mechanism that implements event-contingent insurance.2
Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1998) are also interested in the effect of inﬂation on government
ﬁnances. For the case of Sweden, they conduct a thought experiment that is similar in spirit to
ours: what would be the present value change in the government budget, as of 1994, if there was a
permanent 10 percentage point increase in inﬂation? They ﬁnd a sizeable effect, about as large as
1994 GDP. However, most of this effect is accounted for by incomplete indexation of the tax and
transfer system, as opposed to the direct devaluation of governmentdebt. Despite the large positive
impact on the government’s budget, the authors conclude that the net social gains of the inﬂation
policy are likely to be negative. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2003) examine the ﬁscal
implications of currency crises in three middle-income countries. They ﬁnd that devaluation of
the dollar value of government debt is a more important source of depreciation-related government
revenue than seigniorage, which is the source emphasized by most standard currency crisis models.
A connection between inﬂation and the wealth distribution can also arise through asymmetric inci-
dence of the inﬂation tax. Erosa and Ventura (2002) observe that poor households hold more cash
relative to other ﬁnancial assets than rich households do. They rationalize this fact in a monetary
growth model where access to credit markets is costly. The poor then pay a disproportionate share
of the inﬂation tax and are hurt more by inﬂation. Since inﬂation acts like a nonlinear consumption
tax—with higher rates for the poor—it also encourages precautionary savings and thereby leads
to higher concentration of wealth. Albanesi (2002) derives a positive correlation between inﬂation
and inequality in a similar model, where the inﬂation tax rate is set in a political bargaining game.
Since the poor are more vulnerable to inﬂation, their bargaining power is weak and the rich suc-
ceed in implementing high inﬂation. The key difference between the inﬂation tax literature and our
paper is that the former deals with the effect of anticipated inﬂation on cash holdings. In contrast,
we are concerned with unanticipated shocks on all nominal asset holdings, of which cash holdings
are only a small part.
Our paper is also related to a large literature on the link between the earnings and wealth distribu-
tions in the U.S. The key stylized fact that this literature has wrestled with is that the distribution
of wealth is much more concentrated than that of earnings (see Budr´ ıa Rodr´ ıguez, D´ ıaz-Gimen´ ez,
Quadrini, and R´ ıos-Rull 2002 for an overview of the stylized facts). Both models with dynas-
tic households (for example, Aiyagari 1994, Krusell and Smith, Jr. 1998, Quadrini 2000) and
2See alsoBohn(1990b)forsomeempiricalevidenceonthismechanism,andBohn(1990a,1991)onopen-economy
extensions.
5life-cycle models (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995, Huggett 1996) have been explored. More
recently, several papers have combined features of these two setups by accommodating both life-
cycle concerns for saving and altruism (for example, Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gimen´ ez, and R´ ıos-Rull
2003, De Nardi 2004, Laitner 2001).
Our model is simplerthan those in most of the above studies in that householdsface no uncertainty.
In particular, idiosyncratic labor income risk, the typical source of heterogeneity in the literature,
is absent from our setup. Instead, all earnings heterogeneity is due to differences in deterministic
skill proﬁles across types of households, and wealth inequality is partly generated by preference
heterogeneity. We choose a different modeling strategy in order to be able to calibrate the model
to observed features of speciﬁc groups of households, as opposed to aggregate moments of the
earnings and wealth distribution. At the same time, our model shares several broad themes with
existing studies. One is the importance of bequests for generating a group of rich households that
holds most of aggregate wealth. In our model, agents with high earnings also have a greater ‘warm
glow’ taste for transfers to their children. This may be viewed as a simpliﬁed version of the setups
in Carroll (2000) and De Nardi (2004), who employ preferences where bequests are a luxury good.
A second model feature that helps reconcile the different properties of the earnings and wealth
distribution is the presence of a social security system.
Our model also has two features that are not staples of the wealth distribution literature. One is
the explicit treatment of durables (both consumer durables and houses), which allows a distinction
between ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial wealth. In addition, weassumethat laborsupply is endogenous,
and we calibrate both earnings and wealth observations to a cross section of SCF data. In this
respect, we follow Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gimen´ ez, and R´ ıos-Rull (2003). In contrast, most other studies
work with an exogenous earnings process estimated from panel data.3
2 Nominal Assets and Liabilities in the U.S. Economy
Our methods for constructing nominal positions in the U.S. are described in detail in a separate
appendix to this paper (Doepke and Schneider 2004). Here we describe the organizing framework,
summarize the main steps of the calculations, and present the results. By nominal assets and
liabilities we mean those denominated in U.S. dollars. We deﬁne the net nominal position of
an agent (for example, a sector or an individual household) as the market value of all nominal
3We do not use panel data since, unfortunately,common panel data sets contain little informationabout rich house-
holds, who are particularly prominent owners of nominal assets.
6assets minus the market value of all nominal liabilities. These positions include indirect nominal
positions, which are due to claims on investment intermediaries and the ownership of ﬁrms.
2.1 Indirect Nominal Positions and Valuation
Ultimately, every nominal claim in the economy is owned either by households and non-proﬁt or-
ganizations, by foreigners, or by the government. Some of this ownership is indirect, however,
through ownership claims on businesses. It is convenient to treat investment intermediaries sepa-
rately from other business. Here an investment intermediary is deﬁned as a ﬁnancial intermediary
that issues only one type of claim, namely shares. Examples are mutual funds, bank investment
trusts and deﬁned contribution pension funds.
Indirect positions through ownership of investment intermediary shares can be calculated by as-
signing a fraction of the intermediary’s portfolio to the agent. We deﬁne the zero leverage net nom-
inal position NNP(0) as the sum of directly held nominal assets plus nominal assets held through
investment intermediaries less nominal liabilities. If all ﬁrms in the economy held only real assets
(such as physical and intangible capital) and had no nominal debt, then an agent’s NNP(0) would
be his true net nominal position.
We refer to ownership claims on businesses other than investment intermediaries as equity.S i n c e
the typical business both holds nominal assets and issues nominal debt, we need to make an as-
sumption on how the value of equity depends on inﬂation. We follow Hall (2001) and McGrattan
and Prescott (2004) in adopting a frictionless approach to the valuation of the aggregate business
sector. Let net equity denote the market value of all equity claims on U.S. businesses not held by
other U.S. businesses. We assume that it is equal to the valueof real assets held by ﬁrms plus ﬁrms’
net nominal position at market value (which is negative if ﬁrms are net debtors):
Net Equity = Real Assets of Business Sector + NNP(0) of Business Sector.
We deﬁne the net nominal leverage ratio λ as the indirect net nominal debt position per dollar of
equity held:
λ = −
NNP(0) of Business Sector
Net Equity
.
This ratio is similar to a debt-equity ratio. It differs from conventional measures because it only
incorporates nominalclaims, and becausedebt is netof allnominalassets, includingnominalassets
held indirectly through investment intermediaries.
7The overall net nominal position now can be computed by adding the indirect position to the zero-
leverage position:
NNP(λ)=NNP(0) − λ (Equity Held).
Foranyagent, thisnumbersummarizesexposuretopurelynominaleventsintheeconomy. Changes
in the price level affect the real value of payments that enter NNP(λ). In addition, changes in in-
ﬂation expectations affect the nominal yield curve and hence change both the direct position and
the leverage ratio. The only part of ﬁnancial wealth that is not affected by inﬂation or changes in
inﬂation expectations is the claim on real business assets, which is equal to (1 + λ) (Equity held).
Throughout this section, we only consider claims to future nominal payoffs that are ﬁxed by con-
tract between a borrower and a lender. We do not include positions that arise because of future
nominal tax obligations. The reason is that future tax rates are uncertain and are themselves likely
to change as the result of an inﬂation episode. Indeed, any inﬂation episode entails revaluation
of nominal government debt, so that ﬁscal policy must change to satisfy the government budget
constraint. It is thus difﬁcult to make statements about tax-induced positions outside of a model
that can consider complete scenarios for ﬁscal policy. We thus relegate any tax effects to Sections 4
and 5.
2.2 Data
Our principal data source for sectoral positions is the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States
(FFA), which provides a detailed breakdown of assets and liabilities for the household, business,
foreign, and government sectors, as well as for various types of ﬁnancial intermediaries. We use
quarterly FFA data from 1952:1 to 2002:1. For household positions, we rely on the 1989 and 2001
editions of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which offers detailed information on income
and wealth for a representative cross section of U.S. households.
We deﬁne sectors by aggregating FFA sectors and, in some cases, adjusting FFA deﬁnitions, as
explained in the appendix (Doepke and Schneider 2004). The government sector comprises the
Treasury, state and local government, the Federal Reserve System, and government-sponsored re-
tirement funds. The foreign sector contains not only the FFA ‘Rest of the World’ sector, but also
foreign-owned banks and funding corporations. Our household sector differs from the FFA in that
we do not include the current value of deﬁned beneﬁt pension funds. We treat deﬁned beneﬁt pen-
sion assets as assets of the plan sponsor—the government or the business sector—rather than the
plan beneﬁciary.
8Our business sector aggregates all business other than investment intermediaries. ‘Equity’ is thus a
diversiﬁedclaim on theaggregatebusiness sector. TheFFA does distinguish,however, between eq-
uity in corporate and noncorporatebusiness, and our sectoral calculations use separate values of the
leverage ratio λ when computing indirect positions. We also distinguish ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial
business when interpreting the results below.
For the most part, we use the same instrument categories as the FFA. For some instruments, we use
additional data sources to supplement the FFA numbers. For example, we use the Life Insurers’
Fact Book to determine the size of life insurers’ separate account that backs rate-dependent instru-
ments such as variable annuities. We also use the Survey of Current Business to obtain market
value estimates of foreign direct investment in the U.S. Moreover, we only incorporate ﬁnancial
assets where we can identify both borrower and lender. This is in contrast to the FFA, where the
corporate sector is credited with signiﬁcant “miscellaneous ﬁnancial assets.” The latter includes
accounting items such as goodwill that are not claims on a counterparty.
The SCF provides survey responses from around 3,500 households together with weights that pro-
duce U.S. aggregates. The sample design is particularly well-suited for our purposes since it over-
samples rich households, who hold most assets. We use 1989 as one benchmark year because it is
the earliest year with relatively low inﬂation for which the SCF is available. In addition, we use
the 2001 edition, which is the most recent version of the SCF.
For the benchmark years 1989 and 2001, we combine the SCF and FFA data to obtain one con-
sistent data set where every nominal asset position of a household or sector corresponds to an
offsetting nominal debt position elsewhere in the economy. To arrive at this data set, we adjust
some FFA aggregates to reconcile them with the SCF numbers. We estimate indirect positions at
the household level with the help of nominal leverage ratios derived from the FFA. We also use
supplementary FFA tables to infer indirect positions that SCF households hold in IRAs.
2.3 Payment Streams and Market Value
For most securities, positions in the FFA and SCF are stated at par value. The par values are
not economically meaningful and are not comparable across securities of different maturities. We
address this issue by constructing the payment streams that correspond to each asset. For every






s=1 that the typical owner of the security expects to obtain as of the end of year t.
We estimate payment streams by combining par value information from the FFA with data on
9maturities and coupon interest rates. We do this separately for several major instrument categories.
Forbonds,wedistinguishTreasurysecurities, municipalsecurities, corporatebonds, agency bonds,
mortgage-backed securities, as well as a large numberof short-term securities. For any bond traded
at t, the payment vi
t,s comprises coupon and principal payments that are expected at t + s.
For loans, we distinguish mortgages from other loans, such as business and consumer credit. The
payment vi
t,s on a loan outstanding at t consists of amortization and interest payments due at t+ s.
Our estimation of those payments accommodates both repricing and prepayment. For example,
when we construct payments streams on adjustablerate mortgages, we take into account thedepen-
dence of payments on changes in interest rates. For ﬁxed-rate mortgages, we build in assumptions
on reﬁnancing, which is expected to take place when nominal interest rates fall.
Given the payment stream expected for an instrument beginning of year t, we calculate the market
value of the instrument by discounting the payment stream with the nominal zero-coupon yield
curve for t.L e tit,s denote the continuously compounded nominal yield to maturity in year t on a







We use this formula to derive market value adjustment factors that can be applied to all FFA and
SCF positions, by year and instrument class. The resulting nominal positions at market value are
discussed in the next two subsections.
2.4 The Evolution of Nominal Positions by Sector
Figure 1 summarizes the evolution of nominal positions from 1952 to 2002. The ﬁgure shows the
net nominal positions NNP(λ) of the three ultimate claimants of nominal assets and liabilities:
domestic households, the rest of the world, and the government. All positions are stated as a
fraction of GDP. 4
It is apparent from Figure 1 that there was a structural break in U.S. nominalpositionsaround 1980.
Before 1980, the position of the rest of the world was near zero. The positions of the government
and the households were mirror images, with the government being the major borrower (negative
4Since the NNP(λ) already contain indirect positions throughclaims on businesses, they add up to the discrepancy
of the FFA plus the holdings of nonproﬁt organizations, which together are close to zero.
10NNP)5 and the households being the lender (positive NNP). The positions declined steadily from
around 50 percent of GDP in the early 1950s to around 20 percent in 1980. After 1980, two
things changed. First, nominal claims began to grow more quickly, resulting in a large increase in
government borrowing relative to GDP. Second, the rest of the world started to become a major
net lender. Over the last 20 years, foreigners have built a net nominal position of up to 30 percent
of GDP.6 The rest of the world is now the only major net creditor among end-user sectors, while
the government is the major net debtor. Meanwhile, the net position of U.S. households is close to
zero.
Figure 2 provides a breakdown of different classes of instruments and direct versus indirect posi-
tions. Here the item “short instruments and loans” collects short-term claims such as deposits and
commercial paper together with non-mortgage loans. The instruments in this class mostly have
maturity (or time to repricing) of less than one year. The panel on “bonds” aggregates government
debt, corporate bonds and mortgage-backed securities. The scale is the same across all four panels
of Figure 2, so that the positions in the instrument panels sum to those in the top left (aggregate)
panel. In every panel, the three black lines depict the NNP(λ) of the three end-user sectors: U.S.
households, the rest of the world, and the U.S. government. To illustrate the importance of indirect
positions, the grey line shows the NNP(0) of the household sector. The total indirect position of
the household sector is then given by the difference between the solid black and the grey line. This
position is negative—households are indirect debtors—and amounts to up to 25 percent of GDP.
Figure 2 provides further insights into the changes in U.S. nominal positions that occurred after
1980. Longer maturity claims have become more important for intersectoral borrowing and lend-
ing. In particular, consider the net position of the household sector. Figure 2 shows trend breaks in
net mortgage and bond positions, while the net short position remains stable at ﬁrst, and actually
declines in the 1990s. This reﬂects two developments in the ﬁnancial system. On the one hand,
households have been increasing savings for retirement through pension plans and mutual funds.
Their resulting indirect nominal holdings are more tilted towards long-term bonds than traditional
direct holdings of deposits. On the other hand, securitization of mortgage markets implies that a lot
of mortgages are now ﬁnanced by bond issues. The ﬁnancial sector was traditionally a net holder
of bonds and mortgages, and a net issuer of short instruments. Around 1985, however, the ﬁnancial
sector became a net issuer of bonds. By the year 2000, the value of outstanding bonds amounted
5Notice that the ratio of the government’s NNP(λ) to GDP is not identical to a standard debt/GDP ratio, because
the NNP(λ) nets out all direct and indirect holdings of nominal assets.
6This position consists about equally of bond and mortgage holdings, while short instruments are less important.
Notice that the rest of the world sector contains not only foreign private investors, but also foreign institutions, par-
ticularly private banks and central banks. Mortgage holdings reﬂect direct issues by foreign banks, as well as indirect
ownership of mortgage assets through equity claims on U.S. banks.
11to 40 percent of GDP, which accounts for the large indirect bond position of the household sec-
tor. About half of these bonds are mortgage-backed by loans in federally-related mortgage pools.
Since net outstanding short debt of the ﬁnancial system decreased in the 1990s, it is apparent that
the recent surge in mortgage lending was mostly ﬁnanced by bonds.
This transformation has led to a reduction in the maturity mismatch of the ﬁnancial system. Tra-
ditionally, banks used to hold long-term assets and short-term liabilities. More recently, long-term
mortgage loans have been ﬁnanced by bonds. This change affects the indirect position of share-
holders. In Figure 2, domestic shareholders’ indirect position due to different instruments can be
read from the difference between the solid black and the grey line. Shareholders are always long
in mortgages and short in short-term instruments. However, the recent increase in their indirect
mortgage position has been offset by a substantial short position in bonds. As a result, the portion
of their net position that is subject to a maturity mismatch has declined.
2.5 The Cross-Section of Household Nominal Positions
The SCF data allows us to add detail to the household sector by distinguishing different types
of households. We are interested in heterogeneity along three dimensions: age, wealth, and use
of credit markets. Households are ﬁrst sorted, by age of the household head, into six cohorts:
households under 35, 35–45, 45–55, 55–65, 65–75, and over 75. For each cohort, we refer to the
top 10 percent of households by net worth as ‘rich’ households. The non-rich households are then
sorted by the amount of debt they owe. We refer to those non-rich households whose market value
of debt is above the median for non-rich households as the ‘middle class,’ and to the remainder
as the ‘poor.’ The appendix shows that these labels make sense: our middle-class households
have signiﬁcantly higher net worth and earnings than our poor households. Our sorting by debt
is motivated by the inﬂation experiment that we are working towards. The effect on a particular
household depends primarily on whether that household is a debtor or lender. By grouping all
high-debt households together, we can learn more about their characteristics.7
Table 1 presents householdnet nominalpositionsby age and wealth, togetherwith a decomposition
by instrument class. For every cohort, the average cohort positions have been normalized by cohort
net worth. For comparison, the table also reports durables, equity and net ﬁnancial asset positions.
Here durables equals all nonﬁnancial assets recorded by the SCF minus business wealth. This
position contains mostly real estate, and also consumer durables. Equity consists of direct and
7An alternative sorting by net worth or earnings yields similar stylized facts, that is, among the lower 90 percent
the richer households have more debt.
12indirect holdings of public equity as well as the value of ownership claims on private businesses.
The Net Financial Position (NFP) is deﬁned as wealth net of durables. Ignoring a few minor items,
it may be thought of as the sum of equity and the zero-leverage nominal position:
NFP = Net Worth − Durables ≈ Equity held + NNP(0).
Comparing asset allocation decisions across groups reveals a number of patterns. Middle-class
households invest most of their wealth in durables (mostly houses). Early on in life, they partly
ﬁnance these stocks of durables with large amounts of debt, especially mortgage debt. In contrast,
the poor and rich have little debt, and a smaller fraction of their wealth is in the form of durables.
Moreover, while net ﬁnancial and net nominal positions are smaller for younger cohorts, few co-
horts have negative net nominal positions. Only middle-class households under 55 as well as the
youngest rich cohort are in this group.
Among the older (net lender) cohorts, there are differences in the duration of nominal asset hold-
ings. Old rich households keep a large part of their nominal savings in bonds, whereas the old
poor rely more on short instruments such as deposits. Another feature of the rich is that indirect
debt due to equity holdings signiﬁcantly reduces their net nominal positions at all ages. The old
middle class is quite similar to the poor in terms of retirement savings choices, although they hold
somewhat higher amounts of equity and bonds and fewer short instruments.
3 Inﬂation and Redistribution
Based on the nominal positions documented above, we want to assess the redistribution induced
by a moderate inﬂation episode. Our goal is to estimate (for every sector and group of households)
the present value of the gain or loss encountered if the inﬂation of the decade 1973–1982 were to
return, beginning at the end of a given benchmark year. Both the scale and the nature of redis-
tribution depend on how quickly agents adapt to the new inﬂation regime. On the one hand, the
sooner agents anticipate the higher inﬂation and adjust their portfolios accordingly, the smaller any
wealth effects will be. On the other hand, portfolio adjustment can protect short-term positions
more effectively than long-term positions. As a result, faster adjustment implies comparatively
larger effects on agents whose positions have longer duration. We do not take a stand on exactly
how expectations are formed and portfolios are adjusted during an inﬂation episode. Instead, we
construct two scenarios that provide upper and lower bounds on redistribution, and illustrate the
qualitative implications of adjusting expectations.
13As a lower-bound scenario, suppose that the entire new inﬂation path is publicly announced at
the end of the benchmark year. Bond markets will then adjust immediately, and higher expected
inﬂation will be reﬂected in higher nominal interest rates. The new present value of nominal
positionscan be calculated by discountingagents’ expected payment streams with thenew nominal
term structure. We call this scenario Indexing ASAP, because agents implicitly adjust as soon as
possible to fully-indexed portfolios. The loss on a position in one-year bonds, say, is given by the
change in the present value of a payment promised for next year. There is no loss on future one-
year investments made during the inﬂation episode, since higher interest rates fully compensate for
inﬂation. In other words, money due from one-year investments is protected from inﬂation that
occurs after the ﬁrst year.8 The lack of inﬂation surprises after the initial announcement makes
the Indexing ASAP scenario a lower bound for the absolute value of actual gains and losses. In
addition, it implies that agents with longer duration positions experience relatively larger gains and
losses.
Our upper-bound scenario is that neither inﬂation expectations nor portfolio positions change rel-
ative to the benchmark year during the inﬂation episode. At all times during the episode, the
inﬂation up to that point is perceived as a temporary anomaly, and things are expected to return
to normal the following year. Expectations therefore do not adjust, and portfolio positions as well
as nominal interest rates remain unchanged. This Full Surprise scenario thus captures repeated
inﬂation surprises, a common feature of actual inﬂation episodes. In this scenario, the percentage
present value change is the same for all portfolio positions, regardless of maturity. The size of the
change is determined by the difference in cumulative ten-year inﬂation between the 1973–1982
decade and the decade following the benchmark year. Under the Full Surprise scenario, gains and
losses are not only larger than under Indexing ASAP, but also do not discriminate among agents
with different portfolio duration. Under Full Surprise, agents do not adjust at all to inﬂation, while
under Indexing ASAP they adjust as much as possible.
8For the wealth effects we are interested in, it does not matter exactly how agents achieve inﬂation protection for
short positions. In practice, one could imagine reinvestmentat a higher nominal interest rate or at the real interest rate,
or alternatively earlier consumption. It is also irrelevant how the loss on longer term positions is realized. Since there
is perfectforesightafter the initial announcement,the wealth effectsare the same whether bondsare sold at a loss early
or whether they are held to maturity.
14Computation and Interpretation of Gains and Losses
It is convenient to represent the computations underlying both of our scenarios as adjustments to
the nominal term structure, holding the real term structure ﬁxed.9 Let ın
t and rn
t denote the total
yields on n-year nominal and indexed zero-coupon bonds, respectively, in the benchmark year t.




cumulative expected inﬂation. Let ˜ πn
t denote the new inﬂation path realized from t to t + n.T h e
inﬂation factors for our baseline experiments with benchmark year 1989 are depicted in Figure 3.
We take the real interest rate to be equal to the nominal rate minus realized CPI inﬂation, with the
2003 inﬂation rate used for expectations beyond 2003. 10 The initial expectations πn
t are shown
as the dashed black line starting in 1989. To obtain the new inﬂation path, we replace the ﬁrst ten
years of inﬂation implicit in πn
t by realized inﬂation starting in 1973. The resulting cumulativenew
path ˜ πn
t is shown as the solid grey line starting in 1989.
Under Indexing ASAP, the new inﬂation path is announced at the end of the benchmark year. The
nominal yield curve thus immediately adjusts to ˜ ın
t = rn
t +˜ πn
t . To determine gains and losses, we
revalue the payment streams associated with bonds and ﬁxed rate mortgages using this new yield
curve. Consider a position that promises a single payment νt+k in year t + k. The percentage
loss on this position is 1 − e
−(˜ πk
t −πk
t). The difference between cumulative inﬂation paths (given
by the difference between the solid grey and dashed black lines in Figure 3) is steeply increasing
in maturity. This reﬂects the fact that the Indexing ASAP scenario allows for implicit adjustment




t+k denote the (10 − k)-year
nominaland indexedforward interest rates quoted at t, respectivelyand let ˜ π
t+10
t+k denotecumulative
expected inﬂation from t + k to t +1 0 . Since the Fisher equation holds after the announcement,





































In other words, once the payment is due at t + k, it may be thought of as reinvested at the forward
rate ˜ ı
10−k
t+k which fully incorporates future inﬂation. Equivalently, in real terms, once the loss or
gain from inﬂation up to t + k has been realized, reinvestment takes place at the real rate.
The simplestway to think about the Full Surprisescenario is that all positions are multipliedby the
9The assumption that real interest rates do not move with redistribution is in line with the calibrated model in
Section 5 below, where the redistribution shock has only a small effect on the real interest rate.
10An alternative would be to estimate a time series model for inﬂation and use the forecast from that model. How-




t ). It thus represents revaluation in hypothetical situations where either the
ten-year inﬂation occurs in one day, or, equivalently, where agents are not allowed to touch their
portfolios for ten years. To see that similar outcomes are possible with rebalancing but repeated
surprises, consider again the present value of a position that pays νt+k at date t + k. As under
Indexing ASAP, the investor will take a loss as the real value of the payment at t + k falls to
e−˜ πk
t νt+k. Now suppose the payment is reinvested. Since agents hold on to their original inﬂation
expectations πk
t as the inﬂation episode unfolds, the spot nominal interest rate on a (10 − k)-year
zero-coupon bond quoted at t + k is i
10−k
t+k , which is unchanged from the forward rate quoted in
the bond market at t. This interest rate does not offer full protection against the new inﬂation path
˜ π
10−k
t+k ; there will be an additionalsurprise loss on the positionafter reinvestment. The present value





















The cumulative inﬂation factor for the Full Surprise experiment is represented by the dotted black
line in Figure 3. The Full Surprise loss depends on the difference between the dotted and dashed
black lines and has two parts. First, there is the loss under Indexing ASAP. For all payments due
after ten years, this part makes up for the whole loss—there is no difference between the two
experiments for long-term positions. In addition, there is the surprise loss sk





incurred through reinvestment of short-term positions. It depends on the difference between the
dotted black and solid grey lines and is decreasing in maturity—there are more surprise losses
when reinvesting shorter term positions. Overall, the proportional loss on all positions is s10
t .
Sincetheperiodlengthinourvaluationframeworkisoneyear, theabovediscussionappliesdirectly
only to positions with maturity of one year or longer. We make analogous calculations for shorter
claims. Under Indexing ASAP we assume that positions in deposits, non-mortgage loans and short
term paper—all valued at par in our valuation exercise—can be adjusted within the ﬁrst year of the
inﬂation episode. The idea is that while it typically takes some time before loans can be repriced
or deposits can be withdrawn, agents will try to earn a different interest rate as soon as possible.
We devalue the par values by a six-month inﬂation surprise. Similarly, we devalue adjustable-
rate mortgages with a one-year inﬂation surprise. This captures the fact that, for most ARMs,
adjustment can only occur at speciﬁc times. Under the Full Surprise experiment, all positions are
multiplied by the same surprise inﬂation factor, namely s10
t =˜ π10
t − π10
t . By analogy, we also
multiply deposit, non-mortgage loan, and ARM positions by that factor.11
11We assumeindexingevenoninstrumentsforwhichcurrentinterestratesarezero,suchassomecheckabledeposits.
This is in line with the role of the Indexing ASAP scenario as a lower bound.
16Redistribution across Sectors
Figures 4 and 5 plot redistribution over time under the Full Surprise and Indexing ASAP scenarios,
respectively. Both ﬁgures show aggregate effects as well as redistribution by class of instrument,
following the structure of the position plots in Figure 2. The years on the x-axis now represent
benchmark years for the start of a hypothetical inﬂation episode. Since the hypothetical inﬂation
path is realized inﬂation from 1973–1982, the implied redistribution for the benchmark year 1973
is zero in both ﬁgures. In the Full Surprise case, all positions for a benchmark year t are scaled
by the same surprise factor s10
t . Since the late 1980s, this factor has been approximately constant
and implies a loss of roughly 45 percent per position. The top right panel of Figure 5 also illus-
trates the key difference between our two experiments: under Indexing ASAP, there is virtually no
redistribution due to short instruments.
Among end-users, the government is the only winner, while the rest of the world (ROW) and
domestic households lose. With net debt levels as high as in the 1990s, the government would
gain at least 5 percent and up to 20 percent of GDP from a return of the 1970s. As of the late
1990s, inﬂation has become an elegant way to default on net foreign debt. A return of the 1970s
now would amount to a gift from the ROW of at least 7 percent and up to 13 percent of GDP.
Indirect positions also contribute to overall redistribution, especially since 1980. At the high levels
of businessdebt ofthe late1990s, the indirectgainviathe stockmarket effectivelyoffsetsthe direct
loss made by households.
There are two interesting facts driven by duration. First, foreigners bear a larger share of losses in
a gradual inﬂation episode, since the duration of the ROW position has typically been longer than
that of domestic households. Figure 2 shows that while domestic households are net lenders in
short term instruments and net creditors in (long term) mortgage markets, the opposite is true for
the ROW. The negative net short position of the ROW reﬂects short term paper issued in the U.S.
by foreign ﬁnancial institutions as well as indirect short debt due to equity in U.S. businesses. As a
result of these differences in duration, the ROW loses relatively more under Indexing ASAP,w h e r e
short positions are not revalued. Comparison of the top left panels in the ﬁgures shows that this
effect is especially large during the period 1982–1993. In this period, the ROW would have paid
for more than half of the government’s gain under the Indexing ASAP scenario, but for less than 40
percent under the Full Surprise scenario.
A second fact is that shareholders used to gain little in gradual inﬂation episodes, until the recent
spread of securitization shifted more inﬂation risk to bondholders. This highlights again the trans-
formation of the ﬁnancial system over our sample period. In the traditional banking environment
17of the 1950s and 1960s, anticipated inﬂation would have implied losses on banks’ ﬁxed-rate mort-
gages and bond portfolios that could not be offset by gains on short liabilities. Since the corporate
debt market was relatively small, the losses of the ﬁnancial system would have led to a loss on
the shareholders’ overall indirect position. This explains why shareholders would have lost from
our Indexing ASAP experiment in the 1960s (the solid black line is below the grey line during
that time). In contrast, in the 1980s and 1990s, losses on mortgages are partly offset by gains on
mortgage-backed securities. The increase in corporate debt in the late 1990s implies that by that
time shareholders would have gained from anticipated inﬂation.
Redistribution across Households
Tables 2, 3, and 4 summarize the redistribution of wealth across sectors and groups of households,
based on SCF data for the benchmark year 1989. The tables report the effects under both Full
Surprise and Indexing ASAP. In Table 3, cohort gains and losses are stated in percent of mean
group net worth, whereas in Table 4, they are stated as a fraction of total losses incurred by the
household sector. The latter table thus makes gains and losses directly comparable across cohorts
and serves as the basis for the “redistribution shocks” to be explored below in the context of our
model.
As a general rule, inﬂation beneﬁts young and middle-class households, while it hurts old, poor,
and rich households. The gains to the young middle class arise mostly from debt relief on ﬁxed-
rate mortgages. There is a smaller debt relief effect for the young rich, who have less debt as a
percentage of net worth. To provide further perspective on magnitudes, net worth in 1989 was
equal to 85 percent and 212 percent of annual earnings for the youngest and second-youngest
middle class cohorts, respectively. Therefore, each of these cohorts gains between 19 and 50
percent of annual earnings. In 2003 dollars, theyoungest middleclass cohort gainsbetween $9,100
and $21,200, whereas the 35–46-year-olds gain between $13,300 and $36,200. In aggregate terms,
Table 4 shows that the four winner cohorts receive a transfer of 3.5–9.4 percent of GDP. The two
youngest middle class cohorts pocket about 80 percent of this amount.
Who exactly pays for the losses depends crucially on the duration of the cohorts’ portfolio, and on
whether inﬂation is gradual. Consider ﬁrst the effects for our benchmark year, 1989. Table 3 shows
that the rich suffer relatively more from anticipated inﬂation, whereas the poor are hurt more by
surprise inﬂation. Relative to net worth, the poor retirees lose most under the Full Surprise exper-
iment, which hurts their saving deposits. The rich retirees hold a smaller share of their portfolio
in nominal assets, so that their Full Surprise loss is smaller than that of the middle-class and poor
18retirees. However, to the extent that the rich do hold nominal assets, they invest more in long-term
bonds. As a result, the Indexing ASAP experiment hurts the rich retirees more, in percent of net
worth, than either the poor or the middle class. In terms of aggregates, the old rich households lose
the most—the rich over 55 years of age account for 60 percent of total losses, or 4–10.5 percent of
GDP. In 2003 dollars, the typical loss for a rich retiree below 75 years of age is between $100,000
and $218,000.
The Effect of Financial Innovation in the 1990s
Table 5 reports cohort gains and losses in percent of net worth for the benchmark year 2001. While
anticipatedinﬂationstillfavorsthepoor,thedistributionoflosseshasrecentlybecomeconsiderably
more equal, especially when inﬂation is gradual. In percent of net worth, the poor now lose more
than the rich under both experiments, the lone exception being the oldest cohort under Indexing
ASAP. In aggregate terms, the rich’s share in total losses under Indexing ASAP fell from 76 to 63
percent between 1989 and 2001, while the share of the poor rose from 14 to 22 percent. Under Full
Surprise, the effects are smaller but go in the same direction: while the share of the rich remained
constant at 59 percent of total losses, the share of the poor increased from 22 to 29 percent. The
difference is mainly made up by the poor aged 45–75.12
Several developments in the ﬁnancial system contribute to broader sharing of inﬂation risk. First,
equity ownership has become more widespread. By 2001, equity as a fraction of assets had in-
creased to 21, 19, and 48 percent for the poor, middle and rich groups, respectively, an increase of
roughly 10 percentage points relative to 1989. The stock market gains in the Full Surprise case are
thus shared more evenly among the three wealth groups. Due to an increase in business debt, gains
due to indirect debt are also larger in 2001. For example, the 55–65-year old rich lose 9.7 percent
of net worth on their direct holdings under Full Surprise, but gain 4.3 percent on their equity posi-
tions, for a total loss of only 5.4 percent of net worth. The poor of the same age cohort lose 11.9
percent of net worth on their direct holdings but still gain 2.3 percent on their equity positions, for
a total loss of 9.6 percent. In contrast, in 1989 the same rich cohort won 1.5 percent through equity,
while the corresponding poor cohort gained only 0.6 percent.
Moreover, reduction of maturity mismatch in the ﬁnancial system and the increase in long-term
12The difference does not appear to be due to changes in demographics or cohort wealth distributions. The ratios
of rich to poor net worth for the third through ﬁfth cohorts were 24, 18 and 21, respectively, in 1989, while they were
26, 24 and 17, respectively, in 2001. For working savers, the wealth distribution thus became more unequal, while
inﬂation losses became more equal. In addition, the distribution of losses across generations is quite similar in the two
benchmark years.
19business debt have increased shareholder gains from gradual inﬂation episodes. Since the rich hold
more equity, this also contributed to a more even distribution of gains and losses from gradual
inﬂation across wealth groups. In contrast, the aggregate shift out of short savings instruments
into longer term bonds appears to have affected all wealth groups similarly and has therefore not
contributed to a shift of inﬂation risk. However, it has made the household sector as a whole more
sensitive to gradual inﬂation. For example, Indexing ASAP losses of poor savers aged 45–75 were
about 20 percent of their Full Surprise losses in 1989, but the ratio was one third in 2001. The
same ratio for the rich rose from one half to two thirds. We thus conclude that ﬁnancial innovation
has both increased and redistributed the risk of gradual inﬂation episodes.
4 The Model
We now want to use an economic model to assess the macroeconomic implications of inﬂation-
induced redistribution, as well as the welfare effects on different groups of households. The model
is designed to exhibit the same dimensions of heterogeneity that characterize our data. Conse-
quently, we use an overlapping generations model in which people differ both by age and by type,
where the type will be calibrated to the “rich,” “middle class,” and “poor” groups in our data. Apart
from predictingthereaction ofﬁrms and consumers, themodelwillalsoallowus toexploretherole
of government behavior. As documented above, the government is a major winner from inﬂation
through the devaluation of government debt. We use the model as a laboratory to explore different
reactions of the government to this windfall, such as lower taxes, higher government expenditures,
or increased social security. We will see that the reaction of the government has important impli-
cations for who loses and who gains from inﬂation.
4.1 Setup
Preferences
We consider an overlapping-generationseconomy in which consumers livefor N +1periods, from
0 to N, and derive utility from durable and non-durable consumption. Every period, a cohort of





iui(ci,s,t,d i,s,t, 1 − li,s,t)+vi(bi,s), (1)
20where ci,s,t is non-durable consumption, di,s,t are houses (consumer durables), li,s,t is labor supply,
1 − li,s,t is leisure, and bi,s is the bequest left to the next generation.13 Preferences for bequests
are of the “warm-glow” type, that is, parents derive utility directly from the bequest given to their
children, as opposed to the children’s utility.
The consumer receives a bequest in the ﬁrst period of life, works for the ﬁrst N − 1 periods, and
is retired during the last two periods. During retirement, the consumer receives a social security
beneﬁt from the government. Utility is maximized subject to the following budget constraints:
ci,s,s + di,s,t + ai,s,s+1 =(1 − τs)wsφi,0li,s,s + bi,s−N, (2)
ci,s,t + di,s,t + ai,s,t+1 =(1 − δ)di,s,t−1 + Rtai,s,t +( 1− τt)wtφi,t−sli,s,t (3)
for s<t<s+ N − 1,
ci,s,s+N−1 + di,s,s+N−1 + ai,s,s+N =(1 − δ)di,s,s+N−2 + Rs+N−1ai,s,s+N−1 + trs+N−1, (4)
ci,s,s+N + ps+Ndi,s,s+N + bi,s =(1 − δ)di,s,s+N−1 + Rs+Nai,s,s+N + trs+N−1. (5)
Here ai,s,t are savings, Rt is the interest rate, trs+N−1 is a social security transfer, wt is the wage,
and φi,t−s is an age- and type-speciﬁc skill parameter. Notice that the social security transfer is
indexed by the ﬁrst period of retirement, and is the same in both periods of retirement. In the last
period, instead of buying houses outright, consumers rent the houses at price ps+N. The rental
units are owned by other households as part of their assets ai,s,t, and the price of renting adjusts
such that the return on owning houses is equal to the return on other assets. Equivalently, we could
have assumed that rental services are supplied by a competitive industry that borrows money to
build and rent out houses. We assume that young people buy houses, since otherwise the model
could not match the observations that a large fraction of the population has positive net worth, but
negative ﬁnancial assets. At the same time, we assume that old people rent, so that we do not have
to introduce additional assumptions on what happens to the houses of people after they die.
In a frictionless environment, owning a house and renting in a competitive market are equivalent.
For a part of our analysis, however, we are going to assume that households face a borrowing
constraint. In particular, households are only able to borrow up to a ﬁxed fraction ψ of the value of
their houses:
ai,s,t ≥− ψdi,s,t. (6)
13The explicit treatment of durables allows us to distinguish ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial wealth. The importance of
durables for understanding life cycle patterns in consumption and wealth has been stressed by Fern´ andez-Villaverde
and Krueger (2001).
21As long as ψ<1, a ﬁnancially-constrained household would be better off renting housing services
instead of buying, as long as the housing market is competitive. We still maintain the assumption
that young households buy their houses, because this is the prevalent situation in the data. This
choice could be formally justiﬁed by introducing additional frictions (such as tax advantages) that
favor buying over renting.
Technology
There is a competitive industry that produces the (nondurable) consumption good from physical












Outputcan betransformed into eithertypeof capital orinto thedurableconsumptiongood (houses)
without adjustment costs. Both Kt and Et are owned by households and rented to ﬁrms. Produc-
tivity zt grows at the exogenous and constant rate g:
zt+1 =( 1+g)zt.
Firms rent physical and intangible capital at the common rental rates Rt, and the depreciation rates
are δK and δE. In equilibrium, both types of capital have the same expected return. If in addition
the two depreciation rates are the same, the two types of capital can be aggregated, and the model
economy behaves just like the usual model with labor and physical capital only. Even in this
situation, introducing intangible capital is useful for calibrating the model; in particular, we will be
able to independently match the ratio of business capital Kt to output and the return to capital to
data.
Firms’ ﬁrst-order conditions equate the marginal product on either type of capital to its rental rate
and the marginal product of labor to the wage rate. Due to the absence of arbitrage, the net returns
on both types of capital must also be equal to the interest rate. We thus have:
Rt =1− δk + ztαρ
Yt
Kt
,R t =1− δE + ztα(1 − ρ)
Yt
Et





There is a governmentwhich taxes labor incomeand issues debt to ﬁnance social security transfers,
general government expenditures Gt, and interest on existing government debt Bt−1. The labor tax
τt is linear, does not depend on the type of the worker, and may vary over time. The social security
system consists of lump-sum payments trt−1 and trt to every adult who retired in period t − 1 and
t, respectively. The period budget constraint of the government is:
Bt + τtwtLt = Rt−1Bt−1 + Gt + trt−1 + trt. (8)
Notice that the size of each cohort of retirees is one, so that population size does not enter on the
right-hand side of the budget constraint. We do not assume that the government is benevolent or
maximizes any particular objective function. Instead, our strategy will be to calibrate government
behavior in the balanced growth path to U.S. observations, and then explore the consequences of
different government policies in reaction to an inﬂation shock.
In additionto thedomesticconsumers, wealso allowfor thepossibilitythatforeigners are investing
in the domestic market. Similar to our treatment of the government, the behavior of the foreigners
will be taken as exogenous. Later on, the asset holdings of the foreigners will be calibrated to
the net nominal position of the rest of the world. The assets held by foreigners in period t will be
denoted aF,t. In the model economy, net exports are given by interest payments to foreigners minus
new foreign investment in domestic assets.
This completes the description of the main elements of our model. In Appendix A, we provide the
remaining market-clearing conditions, specify the rental market for houses, and formally deﬁne an
equilibrium.
4.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match aggregate statistics of the U.S. economy, as well as key properties
of the different groups of households that form the basis of our analysis of ﬁnancial data in Sec-
tions 2 and 3. We therefore calibrate the model under the assumption that there are three different
types of consumers, which we will call “the rich,” “the middle class,” and “the poor.” The three
groups are distinguished by their earnings proﬁle, their time preference, and by their preference for
leisure and bequests. Consistent with our breakdown of the data, a model period lasts ten years,
23with the youngest cohort corresponding to ages up to 35 and the oldest cohort comprising those
aged 75 and above.
In order to choose values for household, technology, and government parameters, we select a set
of target moments. The parameter values are chosen such that the balanced growth path of our
economy matches each of these statistics. In most cases, there is no one-to-one relationship be-
tween a moment and a particular model parameter. Nevertheless, it is helpful to distinguish three
sets of moments, one for each sector. For households, the preference parameters and households’
skill proﬁles determine the extent of consumption smoothing over time and across the three goods
(nondurable consumption, houses, and leisure). We use data on labor earnings, wealth proﬁles, and
aggregate statistics to guide our parameterization. The technology parameters determine the accu-
mulation of tangible and intangible capital in the business sector. Here we target the labor share,
the return on capital, and the ratios of depreciation and business capital to GDP. Finally, govern-
ment behavior is calibrated in order to match the ratios of tax revenues, social security spending,
and public debt to GDP.
Preferences and Skill Proﬁles
A key requirement for the functional form of the utility function is to be consistent with balanced
growth. We therefore choose the following period utility function:














and the utility derived from bequests is given by:
vi(b)=ξi
b1− i
1 −  i
.
The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of preferences over consumptionand leisure is standard in the real
businesscycle(RBC) literature. Wealso followtheRBC literaturein choosingtheweightofleisure
σi to match average labor supply to a target of 40 percent of the time endowment (in other words, a
working adult works an average of 40 hours per week out of a total of 100 “disposable” hours, i.e.,
excluding sleep and basic maintenance). The parameter is allowed to vary across groups so that
we can match labor supply for each group individually. Speciﬁcally, if all groups placed the same
weight on leisure, the rich group would work too little relative to the data because of their higher
24wealth, which would also lead to widely different labor supply elasticities in the different groups.14
The elasticity parameters γ, νi,a n d i govern risk attitudes and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. We set γ to the standard value of γ =2 . Balanced growth then governs the remaining
choices, νi =  i =1− (1 − σi)(1 − γ).
The utility weight η determines the expenditure share of durables (which we interpret as houses).
To match η to data, we take two different targets into account: the ratio of residential capital to
physical capital in NIPA (which is 1.44 in 1989), and the ratio of nonﬁnancial wealth to net worth
in the SCF data (58 percent in 1989). The valuation procedures used in these two data sources are
not mutually consistent, so we cannot match both statistics at the same time. As an intermediate
target that takes account of both numbers, we target a ratio of 1.8 for durables to physical capital,
which results in a 36 percent share of durables in net worth.
The parameter ξi determines the expenditure share of bequests. In the data, bequests are highly
concentrated among the richest groups of the population; the vast majority of people do not receive
signiﬁcant bequests at all. For example, Gale and Scholz (1994) reports that only 3.7 percent of
householdsinterviewed for theSCF in 1986 had received an inheritance, and householdsleaving or
receiving inheritances had a net worth that is far above average. We therefore assume that only rich
people care about bequests, setting ξp = ξm =0 . To calibrate ξr, we follow De Nardi (2004) and
target the transfer wealth ratio, which is the fraction of total net worth accounted for by transfers
from other households, including bequests and inter-vivos transfers (but not college payments).
Using the estimate of Gale and Scholz (1994), we target a transfer wealth ratio of 60 percent.
The time preference parameters βi determine the amount of capital accumulation in the economy,
the steepness of lifetime asset and consumption proﬁles, and the relative net worth of different
types of households. We therefore use three different targets to set the βi: the ratio of the measured
capital stock to output in the business sector, which was 1.55 in 1989, the ratio of rich-to-middle-
class net worth, which was 12.64 in the 1989 SCF, and the ratio of middle-to-poornet worth, which
was 1.94. To match these targets, we have to assume that the rich type is signiﬁcantly more patient
than the other types. This follows because the rich have a steeper asset proﬁle, and their share of
total wealth is much higher than their share of labor earnings.15
The skill parameters φi,n are chosen such that the cross-section of labor earnings in the balanced
14In the calibrated model, the Frisch labor supply elasticity at average hours is essentially identical across types,
varying from 0.97 for the middle type to 1.00 for the rich type. These elasticities are within the range of existing
empirical estimates, see Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). In particular, the values are well below estimates
for the elasticity of female and aggregate labor supply, but exceed estimates for males, which is appropriate since the
model is formulated at the level of households.
15See also Carroll (2000).
25growth path of the model matches observed earnings in the 1989 SCF. Notice that because the
balanced growth rate is positive, the cross-section of earnings is not identical to the lifetime proﬁle
of earnings for a given type. In particular, the lifetime proﬁle is steeper than the cross-section
proﬁle, since wages rise over time. Before we can match model earnings to data, a couple of steps
are necessary to ensure a consistent measurement of earnings in model and data. In the SCF, we
observe labor earnings, business income, and private business wealth and other ﬁnancial wealth for
each type and cohort. The model does not distinguish between private business and other ﬁnancial
assets; business wealth in the data is therefore interpreted as a part of overall ﬁnancial wealth in
the model. Here, however, a potential measurement problem arises. Since in the model there is
just one type of ﬁnancial asset, by deﬁnition business wealth has the same rate of return as any
other type of ﬁnancial wealth. In the data, however, we see that the implied returns on private
business wealth (the ratio of business income to business wealth) greatly exceeds the return on
other ﬁnancial assets. We deal with this inconsistency by assuming, perhaps realistically, that part
of what is labeled as business income in the SCF should actually be interpreted as labor income,
since it is derived from running the private business. We therefore construct earnings targets by
adding observed labor income and business income that exceeds the income implied by the return
on ﬁnancial assets in the model. This adjustment is important to match the earnings of the rich,
who derive a large part of their income from private business. Using ei,n for the SCF earnings
of type i and cohort n, bii,n for business income, bwi,n for business wealth, and R for the rate of
return, the earnings targets ˆ ei,n are:
ˆ ei,n = ei,n +[ bii,n − (R − 1)bwi,n].
The average level of earnings in the economy is a scale factor. We therefore normalize the skills of
the youngest poor cohort to one, and choose the φi,n to match the ratio of the earnings of each type
and cohort to the earnings of this group. Table 6 displays the (relative) earnings targets.
Technology Parameters
The only non-standard aspect of our technology is the presence of intangible capital. Since in-
vestment in intangible capital is not measured as investment in NIPA, production Yt and measured
output are not identical concepts in our economy. To link model output and measured output in the





t + Gt = Yt − I
e
t.
26We equate the right-hand side to the NIPA GDP for the business sector. This output is either
consumed or invested in physical (household or business)capital. As mentioned earlier, the ratio of
business capital to measured output is matched to data by choosing the time preference parameters
of consumers. Given this ratio, the share of intangible capital 1 − ρ determines the equilibrium
rate of return. Given our other calibration choices, we ﬁnd that setting ρ =0 .5 leads to a return
of 8.25 percent per year, which is close to the 8.4 percent real annual return on the U.S. stock
market computed by Jagannathan, McGrattan, and Scherbina (2000) for the period 1945–1999.
If we did not allow for intangible capital, the model would imply a much higher, counterfactual
return. The share parameter α determines the fraction of output going towards compensation of
capital and labor. Once again, we cannot match α to thecapital share directly dueto thepresence of
unmeasured output. The measured labor share of our economy is given by wtLt/(Yt − Ie
t),w h i c h
we match to the observed value of 0.66 in the data. The depreciation rate on physical capital can
be inferred directly from NIPA. Given the observed NIPA rate for the business sector, we select 7
percent per year, or δk =1 −(1−0.07)10. Wealsoimposethat alldepreciation rates are identical, so
that δ = δe = δk. Finally, the growth rate g of TFP is set to 2 percent per year, which approximates
the average growth rate of the real output per person in the U.S. economy over the past century.
Behavior of the Government and Foreigners
The government parameters to be calibrated are the labor tax rate τt, the social security transfer
trt, and general government spending Gt. Given these choices, the interest rate and productivity
growth rate pin down the ratio of government debt Bt to GDP in the balanced growth path. We
choose τ to match the ratio of tax revenues to measured GDP to its observed value of one-third.
The social security transfer trt is chosen to match the ratio of social security transfers to measured
GDP, which is seven percent. Finally, Gt is chosen to target the ratio of government debt to GDP.
Our target measure of government debt is the net nominal position of the government,as computed
in Section 2.16
Finally, we need to calibrate the asset holdings of foreigners. Consistent with the calibration to a
balanced growth path, we assume that foreign asset holdings grow at the same rate as output. The
level of foreign assets is calibrated to the net nominal position of the rest of the world in 1989,
16An alternative strategy would be to choose Gt to target the ratio of (non-social-security) government spending
to GDP. However, following this strategy would lead to a counterfactually low ratio of government debt to GDP. The
reason forthis discrepancyis that the model has just one rate of return,which is targetedto matchaverage stock market
returns. Since in the real world government debt has a lower return than equity, we cannot match the government
spending ratio and the debt ratio at the same time. For our redistribution exercise, it is important for the model to have
a realistic ratio of public debt to private debt, which is why we target the debt-to-GDP ratio.
27which is 15.25 percent of measured GDP. The complete model parameterization is summarized in
Table 7.
5 Findings from the Model
In this section, we combine our empirical results in Sections 2 and 3 with the model described in
Section 4 to assess the economic implications of the wealth redistribution triggered by an unantic-
ipated inﬂation episode. We model the arrival of inﬂation as a redistribution shock that displaces
the economy from its balanced growth path. The direction and amount of the redistribution that we
feed into the model is guided by our empirical ﬁndings in Section 3. Speciﬁcally, Tables 2 and 4
display the gains and losses (relative to GDP) for all sectors, cohorts, and classes given a “Return
of the Seventies” inﬂation shock, under two different scenarios on expectations. We will use our
model to assess the reaction of the economy to this redistribution.
The Inﬂation Experiment
Suppose that the economy is still on the balanced growth path in period t. The new inﬂation path is
then announced at the end of period t, and the redistribution takes place at the beginning of period
t +1 . In other words, decisions in period t are not affected by inﬂation, whereas agents begin
period t +1with the asset position after the inﬂation shock took place. The redistribution is zero
sum, and takes place among ﬁnancial assets saved in period t for period t +1 . The generations
affected by redistribution are all generations alive at the beginning of t +1 . Formally, we apply
the redistribution totals in Tables 2 and 4 (relative to measured GDP) as a change to the beginning-
of-period assets.17 In the household sector, the losses or gains of the cohort up to age 35 affect the
initial assets of the cohort 35–44, losses and gains from 35–44 affect initial assets at age 45, and
so on. The youngest cohort under 35 starts with zero assets, and therefore does not experience a
change in its initial assets. The young rich, however, may receive a different bequest because of
the impact on their parents. The level of government debt and net asset holdings of foreigners are
changed as well. Since in the model the last cohort dies at age 85, there is no cohort whose initial
assets are affected by the gains and losses of the cohort aged 75–85. For simplicity, we disregard
the redistribution occurring in this age group.18
17The redistribution in Table 2 does not add up exactly to zero because of data limitations; in each case, we adjust
the gain of the governmentto ensure a zero-sum redistribution.
18To maintaina zero-sumredistribution,we reducethegainofthe governmentbythe amountoflosses inthis cohort.
We have also tried an alternative procedurein which the last cohortis interpreted as “openended” and receivesa larger
28Notice that the model does not actually distinguish between the nominal and real assets that give
rise to the redistribution effect of inﬂation in the ﬁrst place. Since there is no uncertainty in the
model, thereis nomeaningfuldistinctionbetween nominaland real. Ifweformallyintroducedboth
types of assets, agents would be indifferent between them in any equilibrium, so that any proﬁle
of nominal positions could be maintained as an equilibrium outcome. In particular, there would be
one equilibrium where the nominal asset positions exactly reproduce the redistribution numbers of
Tables 2 and 4, given an unanticipated change in the unit of account of suitable size. However, no
further insights would be gained from this formal exercise, as long as the redistribution numbers
continue to be based on our empirical ﬁndings.19
As can be seen from Table 2, the government is a major winner in the redistribution. We thus need
to take a stand on how it will adjust its behavior. If tax rates and real government spending do
not change, the government budget will be in surplus, and the real value of government debt will
decline even further. Alternatively, the governmentcould use the extra revenue to raise government
spending or to lower taxes. In our benchmark experiment, the governmentuses the extra revenue to
raise government spending. The real value of government debt returns to its steady-state value, so
thatwedonotinducepermanenteffects solelyby imposingthemonthereactionofthegovernment.
Alternative government policies will be considered below. We also have to take a stand on the
behavior of foreign investors, who also lose from inﬂation. We treat the foreigners similarly to the
government, that is, we assume that the real value of the foreigners’ assets returns to the steady
state over time.20
The Impact on Households
We begin describing the impact of the inﬂation shock by looking at individual groups of house-
holds, leaving aggregates for later. Our baseline results are for the version of the model without a
borrowing constraint. Figure 6 shows the impact on the consumption of each cohort that is alive
total redistribution. The results were very similar to baseline approach. The main difference is a larger decline in the
old cohorts’ consumption, with little effect on aggregates.
19Of course, it would be a much harder exercise to match the empirical nominal position proﬁles using a stochastic
model with nominal and real assets, in which an inﬂation shock is expected with some low probability. Constructing
such a model is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, given that, as long as the proﬁles are matched, the
resulting redistribution would be the same, we conjecture that most of the ﬁndings from our model would carry over
to a more complicated setting. In particular, the post-inﬂation predictions would be unchanged if after the realization
of the shock there were no further uncertainty.
20Using other assumptions (such as a permanent reduction in the foreigners’ assets) made little difference to the
results, mainly because in the 1989 calibration the holdings of foreigners were still relatively low relative to GDP.
For both government and foreigners, we assume that 50 percent of the gap to the pre-inﬂation net nominal position is
closed per decade.
29at the time of a Full Surprise inﬂation shock. Consumption is displayed as a percentage deviation
from consumption in the balanced growth path. Each panel shows the reaction of each cohort over
their entire life cycle, and periods are labeled by their midpoint. For the cohort 75–85, for exam-
ple, the inﬂation shock hits only in the last period. The graph therefore shows a zero effect until
age 70 (that is, the decade 65–74), because for the oldest cohorts those ages are reached before
the inﬂation shock. The middle-class cohorts 35–54 enjoy the largest positive effect, with a gain
in consumption of up to six percent relative to the balanced growth path. These cohorts have a
relatively large amount of debt (mainly mortgages to ﬁnance houses), and inﬂation lowers the real
value of this debt. The pre-retirement cohort of the middle class (up to age 64) and the rich 35–44
also gain, but to a lesser degree. Finally, the youngest cohort of the poor and the middle class are
winners as well, albeit for a different reason. These cohorts are not directly affected by redistri-
bution, but they gain from general equilibrium price effects. In particular, a decline in total labor
supply leads to a rise in wages.
All other types and cohorts lose from the inﬂation shock. The young rich lose because they receive
a smaller bequest; the others lose because they hold nominal assets that decline in real value. The
oldest cohort ofthe poortakes the largest hit, witha decline in consumptionin excess of 12 percent.
The old are disadvantaged in two different ways. First, they hold large amounts of nominal assets,
which exposes them to inﬂation. Second, they are at the end of their life cycle, which implies that
they cannot smooth the impact on consumption by lowering savings. The impact on consumption
of durables or houses (not shown) is very similar to the impact on consumption: once again the
young middle class wins, while the old, the rich, and the poor lose relative to the balanced growth
path.
Figure 7 shows the impact on labor as a percentage deviation from average labor supply in the
balanced growth path. With the exception of retired households, who have lost this margin of
adjustment,thelosersfrominﬂationcompensatefortheimpactbyworkingmore, whilethewinners
(the middle class) enjoy more leisure. Notice that the cohorts with the largest increase in labor
supply are the pre-retirement cohorts age 55–64 of the poor and the rich. These households have to
use their “last chance” of adjusting, while younger households are able to smooth their adjustment
over several decades.
Figure 8 shows the impact on savings. What is striking about this ﬁgure is the size of the effects.
The middle class 35–44 increase their savings by more than 25 percent of their average savings
in the balanced growth path, while the poor 65–74 experience a decline of more than 25 percent.
Anotherinterestingobservationis thatwhilefromage45 on thereaction oftherich and thepoorare
quite similar, in the youngest cohort it is the poor and the middle class who behave very similarly.
30The reason is that in the youngest cohort only the rich are directly affected by inﬂation through
receiving a smaller bequest. The poor and the middle class only react to changing prices.
The Impact on Aggregates
Figure 9 displays the effect on economicaggregates. Here period 0 is the impact period, and effects
are displayed for the ﬁrst ﬁve decades after the shock. The change in the interest rate is displayed
in basis points, and the effect on the other variables is given as a percentage deviation from the
balanced growth path. In each panel, the solid line corresponds to the Full Surprise experiment
discussed so far. In absolute terms, aggregates move a lot less than type- and cohort-speciﬁc
variables, indicating that the individual effects partially offset each other. Nevertheless, a clear
pattern emerges, which can be related to the individual characteristics of borrowers and lenders in
the economy. The ﬁrst notable feature is a persistent decline in labor supply. This decline is driven
by the middle class, who proﬁt from a positivewealth effect and choose to enjoy more leisure. The
decline of labor supply is partially offset by the rich and the poor. The net effect is still negative,
however, since a large fraction of the losers from inﬂation are retirees, who are unable to adjust
their labor supply. Therefore, the age structure of gainers and losers from inﬂation is key for the
aggregate effect on labor supply.
The evolution of the capital stock is driven by life-cycle effects as well. The capital stock increases
for two decades after the impact of the shock. The relatively young gainers from inﬂation increase
their savings, while the older losers have a smaller decrease in savings, since they are closer to
the end of the life cycle. The capital stock continues to increase over the ﬁrst decades, because
the losers reach the end of their life cycle before the gainers do. The middle-class gainers from
inﬂation are still alive after twenty years, and their additional savings account for the high capital
stock in this period. The effect is reversed when the middle class cohorts who initially had the
largest gains reach the end of their life cycle. After a number of decades, none of the cohorts that
were directly affected by the inﬂation shock remain, and the aggregate effects begin to peter out.
The net impact on output is a decline of up to 0.8 percent relative to the balanced growth path
during the ﬁrst three decades, and an increase of up to 0.25 percent thereafter. Notice that while
the effects are moderate in magnitude, they are extremely persistent. Given an average decline of
about 0.6 percent relative to the balanced growth path over the ﬁrst twenty years, the cumulative
amount of output lost is large. In addition, the output effect is on the same order of magnitude as
what is generated by representative-agent models with monetary frictions. For example, Cooley
and Hansen (1989) ﬁnd that in a standard cash-in-advance model with stochastic money supply,
31a permanent increase in inﬂation from 0 to 10 percent reduces steady-state output by about 0.8
percent (with a cash-in-advance constraint that requires that the equivalent of one month of con-
sumption has to be held in cash). Notice that we consider a smaller experiment (a one-decade-long
shock that adds an average of 5 percent inﬂation per year), and our effects arise from redistribution
only.
So far, we have only considered the Full Surprise inﬂation experiment. Under the alternative
Indexing ASAP assumption, assets and liabilities with maturities below ten years are affected less
by inﬂation, since nominal interest rates are assumed to adjust to the new expected inﬂation path
right away. As Table 2 shows, under this assumption the net loss of the household sector is only
3.1 percent of GDP, instead of 8.1 percent under the Full Surprise assumption. Despite the lower
total amount of redistribution, the economic effects of an Indexing ASAP inﬂation shock are not
just a scaled-down version of the Full Surprise shock. The reason is that the maturity structure of
assets and liabilities differs across sectors and groups of households.
In Figure 9, the effects of the Indexing ASAP experiment are given by the dotted lines. The re-
sponses still have a similar shape, but are generally smaller. The initial impact on output declines
to 0.25 percent, but it is more persistent than in the Full Surprise case. Additional insights can be
gained if we decompose the overall redistribution experiment into two components: redistribution
among households, and redistribution among the household sector as a whole and the government
and foreigners. Figure 9 shows what happens in the Full Surprise experiment if we only redis-
tribute among households in the same amount as before, but isolate the government and foreigners
from the redistribution. In terms of labor supply and output, this households-only redistribution
leads to an even larger labor supply and output effect. The reason is that if the government receives
its windfall, the households are poorer, while the demand for government consumption increases.
Both effects increase labor supply. Turning to capital, results are changed only by a small degree
under the households-only redistribution. This is different under the Indexing ASAP assumption,
where in the households-only experiment the capital stock increases (relative to full redistribution).
The reason for this discrepancy is related to the maturity structure of nominal assets in the different
sectors. Most short-term borrowing and lending takes place within the household sector, while the
government has a large amount of long-term debt. In the Indexing ASAP scenario, where redistri-
bution affects mostly long-term nominal assets, the windfall of the government is a much larger
component of overall redistribution than in the Full Surprise scenario. From the perspective of the
households, the government’s windfall is a loss of wealth, which tends to depress savings. Conse-
quently, removing this loss has a large impact in the Indexing ASAP scenario. In contrast, in the
Full Surprise scenario results are mostly driven by the life-cycle effects of redistribution within the
32household sector.
We repeated both experiments in versions of the model with a binding borrowing constraint, i.e.,
consumers can only borrow up to fraction ψ of the value of their houses. We experimented with
a variety of values for ψ, but found that in each case the results were virtually the same as in the
model without ﬁnancial constraints. Intuitively, a borrowing constraint will change the reaction of
households who are right at the constraint when the inﬂation shock hits. Since these households
are borrowers, they gain from inﬂation; that is, the real value of their debt declines. Compared to
an unconstrained household, a constrained household will spend a larger fraction of the windfall
on additional consumption in the impact period, since consumption was previously limited by the
constraint. At the same time, there will also be a larger increase in leisure, since a constrained
household tends to increase labor supply to overcome the restriction. Quantitatively, however,
these effects turn out to be small. The reason is that only the youngest households are ﬁnancially
constrained, and these households account for only a small part of the overall effects.
Alternative Government Policies
The purpose of our model is to gauge how the economy reacts to the redistribution of wealth
induced by an inﬂation episode. While the model makes precise predictions about the reaction of
the household sector, we had to make assumptions about the reaction of the government, which is
a major beneﬁciary of the inﬂation-induced redistribution. The question arises whether our results
aresensitivetoalternativeassumptionsaboutthegovernment’sreaction totheinﬂationwindfall. To
evaluatetheroleofthegovernment,wecomputedoutcomesunderavarietyofscenariosconcerning
the reaction of the government.
In our model, apart from increasing government spending, the government may put additional
funds to two alternative uses: it could lower taxes, or it could increase social security spending.
The top panel in Figure 10 compares the impact on output across the three possible“pure” policies,
i.e., the entire windfall is used either to increase general spending, increase social security, or lower
income taxes. In each case, we use the Full Surprise scenario; effects are qualitatively similar, but
smaller, in the Indexing ASAP case. We maintain the assumption that real government debt returns
to its original steady state. The shape of the impact on aggregate output is remarkably similar
across the three policies. In each case, output initially declines due to the negative effect on labor
supply, and later increases due to the increased capital stock. Throughout the entire transition,
output is highest if taxes are lowered, and lowest if pensions are increased. The intuition is that
33lowering taxes lowers distortions at the labor-leisure margin, which increases output. Subsidizing
pensioners, in contrast, lowers incentives for saving.
So far, we have taken as given that the effect of wealth redistribution on the government is transi-
tory, i.e., real government debt returns to its original steady state. However, the government could
also decide to permanently keep government debt at its lower post-inﬂation value, which would
allow either a permanent increase in spending or a permanent decrease in taxes. The bottom panel
of Figure 10 displays the output effect of the three possible reactions in this scenario. Since the
economy now converges to a different balanced growth path, permanent effects on output arise.
Lowering taxes leads to the largest increase—about two percent of output in the steady state. Thus,
in the long run, lowering taxes increases output more than increasing government spending. Rais-
ing pensions has almost no long-run effect. Since pensions are paid late in life, in this case the
lower government debt is counteracted by lower private saving.
Welfare Implications
While the redistribution numbers computed in Section 3 give us a good indication of who gains
and who loses from inﬂation, they are not sufﬁcient to determine the overall welfare effect on each
group. Households are also affected by the reaction of the government to inﬂation, as well as by
general equilibrium price changes. To gauge the impact of inﬂation on group-speciﬁc welfare,
Table 8 compares the utility of each type and cohort of consumer alive in the impact period to
balanced-growth utility in the Full Surprise scenario under the three possible government policies,
with government debt returning to steady state. Table 9 provides the same information for the In-
dexing ASAP case. For ease of interpretation, the numbers are expressed as equivalent proportional
variations in consumption (both nondurable and durable). For example, an entry of -1.00 would
indicate that the utility of the household in the inﬂation scenario is equivalent to the utility gained
from the balanced growth allocation, with consumption and housing scaled down by one percent
until the end of the life cycle. For people from the poor and middle groups who have reached the
ﬁnal period of their life, the welfare number is exactly equal to their percentage change in con-
sumption. For younger people, this is not the case, because they can also adjust leisure, and the
old rich can adjust bequests. We also display a weighted welfare criterion that places equal weight
on each group alive in the impact period.21 We discuss the results for the Full Surprise case ﬁrst;
21While a formal political economy analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, our individual and aggregate welfare
measures correspond to the objective functions of two commonly used political economy models, and in this sense
indicate the “political popularity” of inﬂation. Under majority voting, each voter picks the platform which yields
higher utility. In this case, each group’s political preferences can be read off the sign of the group-speciﬁc welfare
34qualitatively, the results under the Indexing ASAP assumption are similar.
Thewelfare calculationsshowthat governmentpolicydetermines thedirectionofthewelfare effect
foranumberofgroupsofhouseholds. Inthebaselineexperimentwithanadjustmentingovernment
expenditure, a majority of households lose from inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, for all but one of the groups
the sign of the welfare change is equal to the sign of the direct redistribution effect in Table 3. The
exception consists of the young and poor households, whose small direct loss is more than offset
by wage increases, which are driven by the reduction in aggregate labor supply. The middle class
aged 35–45 gains most from inﬂation with a positive effect slightly above 11 percent relative to
the balanced growth path, while the oldest cohort of the poor suffers the largest welfare loss of
over 12 percent. In this scenario, there is a direct link between redistribution and welfare, because
the government uses its windfall to increase government spending, which does not enter anybody’s
utility.
The situation is different, however, if the government rebates its windfall to the households. In par-
ticular, if government spending is adjusted through increasing pensions, a majority of households
gain from the redistribution shock, including most of the poor. The oldest group among the poor,
which suffers a 12 percent welfare loss if the adjustment is through government spending, now ex-
periences a gain of 0.3 percent. For a number of groups (including this one) the direct loss through
the revaluation of their assets is more than offset by the compensating higher pension payments.
Thus, while the poor as a group experience a negativedirect redistribution effect, this loss turns out
to be easy to compensate, precisely because it does not take much in terms of transfers to improve
the well-being of the poor. From a political economy perspective, we conclude that the government
can adopt simpleﬁscal policies in reaction to an inﬂation shock which imply that the shock beneﬁts
a majority. Thus, policymakers may be tempted to inﬂate the economy not just because they take
some direct interest in the ﬁscal position of the government, but also because such a policy may
actually have wide support if the losers from inﬂation receive some compensation.22
The temptation of inﬂation becomes even more apparent when we consider the weighted welfare
measure, which is positive in each case. Three effects are at work here. First, the economy as
effect. Probabilistic voting (see Persson and Tabellini 2000) introduces noise to voting decisions, and it can be shown
that voting outcomes are equivalent to maximizing a weighted welfare function of the same type as our aggregate
welfare measure.
22It is intriguing to observe that the U.S. inﬂation episode in the 1970s started right after social security was ﬁrst
indexed to inﬂation in 1972. While this policy change is unlikely to have been the main cause of the episode, it
certainly lowered the political cost of inﬂation, and therefore may help explain why it took a decade until inﬂation
was brought under control. In fact, the formula for the cost-of-living adjustment of social security was originally
speciﬁed incorrectly. The retirees were actually overcompensated for inﬂation until 1978 (see Duggan, Gillingham,
and Greenlees 1996), so real pensions rose as a result of inﬂation, just as in our “Pensions Adjust” policy experiment.
35a whole experiences a net gain, because inﬂation deﬂates the wealth of foreigners. Second, a
reduction in government debt also registers as a welfare gain, since Ricardian equivalence does not
hold in our OLG-economy with distortionary taxation. Third, inﬂation redistributes wealth from
the rich to the middle class and to some of the poor. Since the rich have the lowest marginal utility,
this redistribution also has a positive impact on the weighted welfare measure.
We can gauge the relative importance of the taxation of foreigners by computing results for an
otherwise identical experiment that leaves the real value of the foreign asset holdings intact. In
other words, redistribution takes place only between domestic households and the government,
while the rest of the world is protected from inﬂation. To balance the total redistribution, we assign
a smaller gain to the government. In this scenario, the overall welfare effect remains positive,but is
smaller. In the Full Surprise case with government debt returning to the steady state, the weighted
welfare effects are 0.17 if government spending adjusts, 0.99 when taxes adjust, and 0.98 when
pensions are raised. In the spending experiment, the exclusion of foreign debt has almost no effect
on welfare. The reason is that neither government spending nor the consumption of foreigners
enter utility, so that the taxation of foreigners makes little difference to the domestic households if
the government consumes all the gains. In the tax and pensions experiments, the implicit taxation
of foreigners contributes slightly more than 50 percent of the overall welfare effect. The welfare
effect is also positive if neither foreigners nor the government are affected by inﬂation, i.e., if we
consider redistribution among consumers only. Here the welfare numbers are the same as the ones
we got previously under the assumption that government spending adjusts.
The welfare effects are similar if we work under the alternative assumption that government debt
does not return to the steady state. Even though we saw that making permanent changes to debt
and taxes can have a sizable effect on output in the balanced growth path, this is of little relevance
to the initial generations. The results are also qualitatively unchanged if we consider the Indexing
ASAP scenario. Individual welfare effects are generally smaller due to the reduced redistribution
volume, but duration effects are important. For the poor, for example, losses are much smaller
under the Indexing ASAP scenario relative to Full Surprise, since most of their nominal assets are
short term. For the rich as well as for the government and foreigners, the difference between the
two scenarios is smaller. Once again, the weighted welfare effect is positive in each scenario.
When interpreting these results, one has to keep in mind that our model isolates only the welfare
implications of the redistribution effect of an inﬂation shock. The traditional literature on the
welfare cost of inﬂation, in contrast, builds on monetary frictions (from which we abstract), and
ﬁnds that inﬂation lowers welfare. At the same time, the size of the effects is generally shown to
be small, so that the positive effects arising from redistribution that we document here are likely
36to dominate. To give a concrete example, the estimates by Lucas (2000) imply that a permanent
rise in inﬂation from zero to ﬁve percent lowers welfare in steady state by the equivalent of about
0.5 percent of consumption. The inﬂation shock that underlies our experiments is smaller, since
it is transitory: inﬂation increases by about ﬁve percent over a single ten-year period. Even so,
as long as the government’s windfall is not used to increase government spending (which does
not enter utility), in every scenario the positive welfare effect arising from redistribution is at least
twice as large in absolute value as Lucas’ welfare cost estimate. In the Full Surprise scenario, the
positivewelfare effect exceeds two percent for both the tax rebate and pension policies. Thus, even
when we take into account standard estimates of the welfare cost of inﬂation arising from monetary
frictions, the conclusion remains that under suitable government policies, the overall welfare effect
of an unanticipated inﬂation shock is positive and large.
Results for Baseline Year 2001
We saw in Section 2 that there have been substantial changes in the net nominal positions of dif-
ferent sectors of the U.S. economy over the last 15 years. Most importantly, there has been a large
decline in the net nominal position of the household sector, and a corresponding increase in the po-
sition of the rest of the world. We repeated our experiment with redistribution numbers generated
from data in 2001 to gauge how important these changes are for the effects of inﬂation. To make
results comparable, we used the same model calibration as before (apart from the asset positions
of the rest of the world and the government, which were adjusted to their 2001 values).
Figure 11 shows the impact on economic aggregates for the 2001 experiment. Qualitatively and
quantitatively, the effects are very similar to 1989 results. Important differences do arise, however,
when we consider the welfare implications. The weighted welfare measures now show a bigger
positiveeffect ofupto3.13percent intheFullSurprisescenariowithanadjustmentintaxes(0.33if
spendingadjusts,and 3.04withan adjustmentinpensions. Thenumbersforthegradual experiment
are 0.21, 1.62, and 1.53 in the spending, taxes, and pension scenarios). The main reason for this
larger effect is the increased net nominal position of the rest of the world. The devaluation of assets
owned by foreigners is a windfall from the perspective of domestic households. The importance
of foreigners can be gauged by recomputing the experiment under the assumption that foreigners
are isolated from inﬂation (as if, counterfactually, foreigners only held inﬂation-indexed bonds).
The weighted welfare effects in the spending, tax, and pension experiments are 0.21, 0.47, and
0.45 percent in the Indexing ASAP scenario, and 0.33, 0.52, and 0.52 percent in the Full Surprise
scenario. Thus, under the assumption that the government uses its windfall to either rebate taxes or
37raise pensions, the inﬂation tax on foreigners accounts for between 70 and 85 percent of the overall
welfare effects.
In summary, across all our experiments we ﬁnd that inﬂation-induced redistribution has a positive
effect onstandard weightedwelfaremeasures. Evenifweabstract fromthefact thatforeignershold
a sizable amount of domestic nominal assets, these positive effects are large enough to outweigh
standard estimates of the welfare cost of inﬂation arising from monetary frictions. The large recent
increase in foreigners’ holdings of domestic, dollar-denominated debt, however, has made inﬂation
an even more attractive proposition from a U.S. perspective. In effect, foreigners are currently
lending large amounts of funds to the U.S. at terms of repayment that are under control of the U.S.
Federal Reserve System. Even moderate taxation of these funds through an increase in inﬂation of
about 5 percent per year would result in substantial welfare gains for U.S. households.23
6 Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to examine the importance of wealth redistribution as a channel for real
effects of inﬂation. We have documented the distribution of nominal assets and liabilities in the
U.S. economy, and we have used those numbers to compute the wealth redistribution that would
be induced by a moderate inﬂation episode such as the 1970s. We ﬁnd that even moderate inﬂation
leads to sizeable redistribution of wealth. The wealth effects of inﬂation induce highly persistent
effects on both individual welfare and aggregate economic activity. The main source of aggregate
effects is that borrowers are younger than lenders. Standard life cycle considerations imply that the
responses of young winners and old losers are not offsetting.
Discussion of optimal monetary policy in the U.S. is often based on models with monetary fric-
tions, where inﬂation causes inefﬁciencies and therefore lowers welfare. Our model abstracts from
frictions to isolate the distributional effects of inﬂation. Based on U.S. data, we show that the re-
distribution caused by an inﬂation episode tends to increase the welfare of domestic households on
average. This conclusion arises for two reasons. First, inﬂation imposes a tax on foreigners who
23While these ﬁndings depend on the speciﬁc distribution of nominal assets and liabilities that we documented for
the U.S., there is evidence to suggest that similar features may have played a role in other historical inﬂation episodes.
For example, concerning the German hyperinﬂation of 1923, Holtfrerich (1986) ﬁnds that the distribution of wealth
was leveled,with the richlosingthe mostandthe gainsbeingconcentratedinthe middleclass. Moreover,“a signiﬁcant
proportion of creditor’s losses arising out of the inﬂation was borne by foreigners who had taken up creditor positions
in marks. The losses these suffered were of at least the same order of magnitude as German Reparation Payments
between 1919 and 1923.” (p. 333). Thus, despite the severe economic disruption caused by the hyperinﬂation, the
distributional impact may have been among the key factors that rendered inﬂation attractive.
38hold domestic nominal assets. If the foreign net nominal position is positive, inﬂation creates a
windfall from the perspective of domestic households. Second, inﬂation tends to redistribute in-
come from the relatively rich to the relatively poor, which is also registered as an improvement by
standard weighted welfare measures.
Our ﬁndings therefore lead to some doubts regarding the conventional wisdom that low inﬂation
is always in the best interest of the domestic population. There is a sizable fraction of the U.S.
population which would stand to gain if another inﬂation episode such as the one in the 1970s were
to occur. As more and more nominal assets are held by foreigners, this fraction of the population
continues to grow. Currently, the potential welfare gains from taxing foreigners’ nominal assets
through a moderate increase in inﬂation easily outweigh standard estimates of the welfare cost of
inﬂation. The current widespread optimism regarding continued low inﬂation in the foreseeable
future may be misplaced.
We do not mean to suggest that policymakers should use inﬂation systematically to achieve dis-
tributional purposes. Clearly, a systematic policy of this kind would be impossible to implement,
since redistribution arises only to the extent that inﬂation is unanticipated. At the same time, if
the potential gains from inﬂation through redistribution are large, policymakers may ﬁnd it more
difﬁcult to resist the temptation of inﬂation. Being aware of the potential redistribution effect may
be important even if controlling inﬂation is the ultimate aim.
To this end, our analysis may provide a useful starting point for future research into the political
economy of inﬂation. One of our key ﬁndings is that the cohort welfare effects are highly sensitive
with respect to the ﬁscal policy regime followed by the government. If the government simply
raises general spending, only the young middle class experiences a net gain from inﬂation, so that
inﬂation would not be widely popular. If the windfall is used to raise pensions, however, the poor
as well as the old middle class are compensated for all their losses, and most groups, apart from
the very rich, stand to gain from inﬂation. As we discuss above, during the 1970s the U.S. did
have a policy of compensating retirees, since social security pensions were (perhaps inadvertently)
over-indexed to inﬂation starting in 1972. Our results suggest that this policy may have contributed
to the political sustainability of inﬂation. In future research, we plan to explore the role of ﬁscal
policies and redistribution effects in other historical inﬂation episodes.
39A Deﬁnition of an Equilibrium
























[di,s,t − (1 − δ)di,s−1,t−1],
I
k
t =Kt+1 − (1 − δk)Kt,
I
e
t =Et+1 − (1 − δk)Et,
NXt =RtaF,t − aF,t+1.
where µi is the size of group i, and we have


i µi =1 . For the deﬁnition of an equilibrium, we
also have to be more speciﬁc about the rental price of houses, and the amount of assets committed
to housing the old. The houses rented by the old people are part of the stock of assets owned by
other households. The rental price of houses adjusts such that the return to investing in houses for
rent is equal to the interest rate. If the rent is pt per unit, investing in one house requires 1 − pt per









The amount of assets committed to housing the old is given by:









Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium consists of a sequence of prices {wt,R t,p t}, house-
holdallocations{ci,s,t,d i,s,t,a i,s,t,l i,s,t,b i,s}, foreigners’assets{aF,t}, ﬁrmdecisions{Yt,K t,E t,L t},
and government decisions {Bt,τ t,G t,tr t} such that:
1. Given prices, the households’decisions maximize utility (1) subject to the budget constraints
(2)-(5) and the borrowing constraint (6).
2. Given prices, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, i.e., (7) is satisﬁed.
403. The government budget constraint (8) is satisﬁed in every period.
4. The rental market clears, i.e., (9) holds.







t + Gt + NXt = Yt.







7. The asset market clears in every period:
At + aF,t = Kt + Et + Dt + Bt.
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Government Rest of World Total Losses Gains
1989 +14.1 +5.2 -6.7 -2.3 -8.1 -3.1 -17.5 -6.6 +9.4 +3.5
2001 +15.9 +6.7 -13.4 -5.8 -3.4 -1.9 -12.0 -6.0 +8.6 +4.1
Net Gain from Full Surprise and Indexing ASAP Experiments.
Table 2: Redistribution across Sectors, 1989 and 2001, in Percent of GDP
Age Poor Middle Rich
<35 -6.4 -0.3 +60.9 +22.2 +5.8 +1.5
35–45 -3.9 -2.1 +20.7 +8.7 -1.7 -1.4
45–55 -5.9 -1.7 +5.5 +2.2 -3.1 -2.2
55–65 -12.5 -2.9 -0.8 -0.1 -7.1 -2.7
65–75 -13.3 -2.0 -8.9 -2.5 -7.2 -3.3
>75 -14.3 -1.0 -16.5 -2.0 -11.4 -4.7
Net Gain from Full Surprise and Indexing ASAP Experiments.
Table 3: Redistribution in 1989, in Percent of Net Worth
All Poor Middle Rich
Age -47 -49 -22 -14 +32 +41 -57 -76
<35 +27 +24 -1 -1 +22 +21 +6 +4
35–45 +14 +12 -2 -2 +20 +22 -4 -8
45–55 -5 -12 -3 -2 +6 +6 -8 -16
55–65 -28 -24 -8 -5 -1 0 -19 -19
65–75 -30 -29 -7 -3 -6 -5 -17 -21
>75 -25 -20 -1 -1 -9 -3 -15 -16
Net Gain from Full Surprise and Indexing ASAP Experiments.
Table 4: Redistribution in 1989, Group Totals, in Percent of Total Loss of Household Sector
45Age Poor Middle Rich
<35 -7.1 -4.0 +101.7 +54.1 +2.5 +2.4
35–45 -4.1 -2.5 +27.8 +15.1 +1.0 +0.4
45–55 -6.2 -2.9 +9.0 +1.9 -1.4 -1.4
55–65 -9.6 -3.7 +2.1 -1.1 -5.4 -2.9
65–75 -12.4 -3.6 -0.1 -1.0 -6.4 -3.2
>75 -11.8 -1.6 -10.5 -2.5 -7.1 -3.4
Net Gain from Full Surprise and Indexing ASAP Experiments.
Table 5: Redistribution in 2001, in Percent of Net Worth
<35 35–45 45–55 55–65
Rich 3.41 7.07 5.80 4.25
Middle Class 2.34 3.42 3.65 2.00
Poor 1.00 1.91 1.72 0.87
Table 6: Relative Earnings Targets
Preferences Skills Technology Government
γ =2 φr,0 =2 .59 φm,0 =2 .39 φp,0 =1 .03 α =0 .41 τ =0 .5
σr =0 .66 φr,1 =5 .15 φm,1 =2 .96 φp,1 =1 .52 ρ =0 .5 tr =0 .03
σm =0 .71 φr,2 =6 .13 φm,2 =3 .11 φp,2 =1 .49 δ =0 .52 G/Y =0 .24
σp =0 .70 φr,3 =8 .10 φm,3 =2 .35 φp,3 =1 .13 δK =0 .52
η =0 .23 φr,4 =0 φm,4 =0 φp,4 =0 δE =0 .52




Table 7: Calibrated Parameter Values
46Spending Adjusts Taxes Adjust Pensions Adjust
Age Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich
<35 0.62 0.61 -1.66 3.77 3.87 -0.57 0.64 0.62 -1.45
35–44 0.09 11.05 2.73 3.67 14.55 3.60 0.37 11.21 2.86
45–54 -1.05 10.02 -2.33 1.64 13.02 -1.98 -0.25 10.51 -2.19
55–64 -3.17 3.12 -3.40 -1.84 4.71 -3.22 -0.39 4.72 -3.20
65–74 -9.92 -0.78 -5.42 -9.79 -0.57 -5.25 2.86 6.62 -4.90
≥ 75 -12.45 -6.67 -4.97 -12.19 -6.32 -4.43 0.29 0.96 -4.65
Total 0.17 2.28 2.24
Table8: Welfare Effectsbased on Redistributionin1989 forDifferentFiscal Policies, FullSurprise
Experiment, Public Debt Returns to Steady State
Spending Adjusts Taxes Adjust Pensions Adjust
Age Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich
<35 0.16 0.16 -0.67 1.43 1.47 -0.25 0.17 0.16 -0.59
35–44 -0.10 3.91 0.72 1.36 5.35 1.07 0.01 3.98 0.76
45–54 -0.69 4.13 -1.37 0.40 5.36 -1.26 -0.39 4.31 -1.33
55–64 -0.95 1.26 -1.97 -0.42 1.91 -1.93 0.12 1.87 -1.90
65–74 -2.32 -0.18 -1.95 -2.27 -0.11 -1.90 2.83 2.80 -1.74
≥ 75 -1.94 -1.88 -2.20 -1.81 -1.73 -1.98 3.23 1.22 -2.06
Total 0.22 1.09 1.01
Table 9: Welfare Effects based on Redistribution in 1989 for Different Fiscal Policies, Indexing
ASAP Experiment, Public Debt Returns to Steady State
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Figure 1: Net Nominal Positions, Sector Aggregates
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Figure 2: Net Nominal Positions, Sector Aggregates by Instrument


















































Figure 3: Inﬂation Expectation Factors for Redistribution Experiments
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Figure 4: Full Surprise Experiment, Redistribution across Sectors over Time
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Figure 6: Impact on Lifetime Consumption, in Percent Deviation from Balanced Growth Path,






















































































































Figure 7: Impact on Lifetime Labor Supply, in Percent Deviation from Average Labor Supply on
























































































































Figure 8: Impact on Lifetime Savings, in Percent Deviation from Average Savings on Balanced
Growth Path, based on Redistribution in 1989, Full Surprise Experiment
















































































Figure 9: Impact on Economic Aggregates, in Basis Points (Interest Rate) and Percent Deviation
from Balanced Growth Path (other Variables), based on Redistribution in 1989







































Figure 10: Impact on AggregateOutput by Policy Experiment, in Percent Deviationfrom Balanced
Growth Path, based on Redistribution in 1989, Full Surprise Experiment













































































Figure 11: Impact on Economic Aggregates, in Basis Points (Interest Rate) and Percent Deviation
from Balanced Growth Path (other Variables), based on Redistribution in 2001
53